George Brown

Riordan:

If you had to pick three principal reasons for the demise of the Super Collider, micropolitical or macropolitical, what would you say they were?

Brown:

Well, let me just stress, in general, that some of these reasons flow into each other. I would say macropolitical probably heads the list, because in that category I include the increasing stringency of the budget constraints, which faced the entire federal budget, which make vulnerable the more conspicuous targets within the science envelope, and the Superconducting Super Collider along with the space station were the two largest targets. Both of them were under very, very serious attacks just on the basis of the question, “Can we support them?” The stringent budgetary situation that we had…

So far, the station had survived because the administration… It was already to some degree, to a large degree, based on international cooperation. The SSC never was and failed in its effort to get international contributions. But, in addition to the station starting out with the [Canadian and Japanese partners], it was able to bring Russia in as a major partner, which provided two benefits. One, it provided peaceful employment for Russian scientists who might otherwise have been building rockets, and appealed therefore to an element of the Congress that was concerned about [national] security rather than science. That was important. And their technical contributions also made much more an opinion [inaudible]. So, they became primary partners contributing technology and resources, and in addition the foreign relations and national security element of co-opting a former enemy into a friendly one added a measure of benefit to the program. That’s macropolitical.

The Superconducting Super Collider began initially with the idea that it could be done strictly with U.S. resources. When it became obvious that it would benefit from some additional resources, efforts were made to attract help from the Japanese primarily, but also from the Europeans and from other countries. To a considerable extent, hope for involving the Europeans was illusory from the beginning, because they were fighting to finance their expansion of the [CERN collider]. They were trying to finance the Large Hadron Collider, and they were having difficulty doing that. So, they were not about to offer the support for the Superconducting Super Collider. Although they were interested. It wasn’t with them a matter not wanting to cooperate. It was just they couldn’t do both. They couldn’t fund their own machine and help this one. The Japanese attitude was, “We’d like to help, but we’re not sure that you’re going to finish the thing.” It turned out that they were right. So, these macropolitical aspects of it doomed the Superconducting Super Collider. The space station, a comparable big-science project, would survive because they were able to build their previous international support to an even higher level, and bring in national security aspects as well.

Now, that’s one level of explanation for the demise of the SSC. Now, at the micropolitical level, it helps to have somebody categorize these for me, organize them for me.

Riordan:

Actually, I have a whole list.

Brown:

I know you do. Good historians always do that. As you know, we started out on the Superconducting Super Collider thinking that we were doing everything right. It had what we thought were appropriate long-range budgets, strong commitment from the Department of Energy, from the scientific community — that is, the particular branch of physics that was interested — and strong support from the President. Where it didn’t have support, and this falls well within the micropolitical category, it never had an authorization from Congress. It was never specifically debated in both the House and the Senate. The consensus arrived at was that this was important, and it needs to have a long-range authorization, which could be funded annually, but which gives us the method to do the whole project.

Originally, despite this, [the SSC project] went ahead on the basis of a well-thought-out effort to involve all of the states, and their making proposals for a site. You had a couple dozen or so states that became tremendously interested. It was a real economic plum if you could grab this. Texas had the best foresight and the best package. In effect, a contribution of one billion dollars, a site that met all of the necessary requirements, and offers to sweeten the pot in various other ways. This was at a time when Texas was involved in a realignment of its state policies from those based on natural-resource extraction — oil, cattle, that sort of thing — to human resource development. To improve higher education. They had got a lot of [academic] chairs at the University of Texas. They brought in some top physicists. They promised in connection with the Superconducting Super Collider to make available the training of the scientists who would be working on it, upgrading education for their kids — all sorts of attractions in terms of education. They really had a very good proposal.

California had a lousy proposal. It was at that time when all of the states were in play. Representatives from all those states were saying great things about the Superconducting Super Collider. When the process was over, and the support began to drop away, one of the primary opponents was Congressman Sherry Boehlert from New York, who had been a supporter as long as a New York site was in the play. The unique thing about the New York site that they were promoting was that they were claiming it as an international site. It was sort of like CERN, which is partly in Switzerland and partly in France. In this case, the [SSC site] would be partly in New York and partly in Canada. That didn’t sell. It never got off the ground, as a matter of fact.

Riordan:

I think it was the siting rules of the Department of Energy. [Editor’s note: The proposed site had to be entirely within the boundaries of the United States.]

Brown:

Probably. In any event, that was merely an illustration of the fact that, the site choice having been made, and Congress not having endorsed this choice with a vote to support a long-term authorization, the President’s support began to come in feeble. [ed. This probably refers to President Bill Clinton, who, unlike President George H. W. Bush, did not give the project his unambiguous support.]

At the third level, the problems were exacerbated when it became clear that the original estimates on cost and schedule had been low-balled. In other words, the money was… The original estimates were less than the schedules finally turned out to be the case. Now, any sensible person knows enough to expect that this would happen. How much is always a question — 25 percent, 50 percent, or a hundred percent. But in this case the SSC began to approach the boundaries of going beyond the cost-and-schedules estimates. And that accelerated the flight of support. Then, some members [of Congress] were able to engage in some aggressive oversight through several different committees, but it was Sherry Boehlert who actually used his role as the minority leader of the oversight committee on science to raise all kinds of hell with the program. Now, that was never officially condoned by the Science Committee [ed., which Brown chaired from 1991 until the Republicans took over the House in the 1994 election]. On the other hand, I personally didn’t think that I had to fight, nor would it be politically desirable to try and suppress criticism coming from a member of the committee exercising his [right of] oversight. And this also happened in other committees, so it wasn’t unique. But it contributed to a decline of support.

Then the longer [the project] stretched out, the fewer [the] people who had any commitment to it. When I made a commitment to support the SSC, it was not based on whether it would go to California or not. It was based upon the importance of this contribution to science and the need in the high-energy physics field to have a new machine, because they had begun to see the end of what they could do with existing machines. As you well know, at SLAC you could go so far, and after you had found out most of what was possible, you needed a new machine, and you’re going to get one. That was happening in high-energy physics, and I felt it was important on a global basis for the U.S. to continue to be in the forefront, and this is what we had to do. We had to try and come up with a machine about this size and energy and continue to support it. I’m probably one of less than two dozen members of Congress whose decision was based on this kind of reasoning. For the rest of them it was: “Are there any goodies for our state? An economic contract coming to companies in our area?” Or other things of that sort.

Riordan:

Okay, I think you’ve answered my question in great deal and in great texture. Can I run by you a list of factors and get your feeling about them? If you want to rate them on a scale of 1 to 10, I’d appreciate it. Please feel free to make any further comments that you feel appropriate. One, first of all, was there an appearance of mismanagement?

Brown:

I’m aware of the fact that those accusations were made. They didn’t influence me, and I don’t think they had a strong influence on other members.

Riordan:

Okay, so you’d say on the low-end side?

Brown:

The low-end side.

Riordan:

How about the Department of Energy management of the project? [long pause] In terms of taking it to Congress and in terms of how the DOE interacted with the laboratory?

Brown:

I don’t blame the department for not bringing the SSC to Congress for an authorization. They were under influence from certain members of Congress not to bring it to Congress. People like [Louisiana senator] Bennett Johnston, for example, who is a major force in the Senate and doesn’t like authorization bills. That’s another micropolitical aspect of this. The Department of Energy has not had a full authorization bill — or a partial authorization bill — for a decade, and that’s because Bennett Johnston chairs both the authorization and the appropriations committees and he doesn’t want to have to do his work twice. He prefers to do it all in the appropriations committee because it’s much easier. [ed. Johnston simultaneously chaired the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Energy and Water Development Subcommittee during the SSC debate. Authorizing legislation establishes policy in law, and a full authorization sets policy across an agency, whereas an appropriation provides funding on an annual basis and, in effect, sets policy for budgeted activities.]

Riordan:

He has more control over the process — the public...

Brown:

So, your question is mismanagement at the departmental level. You cited that as a possibility. I do not consider that to be mismanagement at the departmental level. There may have been some lack of anticipation of public and congressional reaction, which could be categorized as poor judgment, but not mismanagement.

Riordan:

How about the failure of principals to communicate the scientific goals? That’s us. That was me, my job for a year.

Brown:

See, the problem there is that if you convey the true scientific goals, they don’t really appeal to a lot of congressmen. So, if you try to imply a secondary set of goals that follow from the breakthroughs resulting from the first set of goals, you’re skating on thin ice. You did convey to a lot of members of Congress potential results of that breakthrough in knowledge — that were fantastic and highly implausible. That is not necessarily a flaw in the importance of the goals as you present them; it’s a flaw in the ability of the members of Congress and the public to understand the complexity of the results of scientific breakthroughs. That is the problem. You can point to the development of Einstein’s theory as [important?] for the progress of the world. If you had tried to present all of the technological marvels that could legitimately be traced to the theoretical breakthroughs that Einstein was responsible for, it would be absolutely mind-boggling. If you had presented them at the time, they would have been laughed out of court. You were faced with that kind of problem, and you didn’t solve it. That’s what they fault you for, not that you didn’t make an honest effort to present the importance of the science that would be involved. It’s just that the audience is not ready for it. You’ve got to do a lot more than just build a case for its importance to science. If you can make the case that the USSR is doing it, and if they do it they may come up with another super bomb — fantastic as this may be — you’d get a hell of a lot more support from Congress.

Riordan:

This brings up my next one. This is a macro-macropolitical issue: the end of the Cold War.

Brown:

The end of the Cold War, the lack of competition with the Russians in science as well as in the military arena, was a major factor in reducing the priority of the program. You know, we had for a generation — two generations — felt that showing the Russians that we were superior to them in every area of science and technology was an important national goal. It was related to our national security. That priority disappeared.

Riordan:

How about the choice of Texas as the site over…?

Brown:

Well, it’s not Texas. It’s any state. The flaw in the process was that you teased a lot of states into developing a strong posture of support, and then you let them down before they could be satisfied. There was [intentionally] a sexual parallel.

Riordan:

Particularly, I would say over Michigan.

Brown:

Well, I think that may be the case. There were different factors at work. Illinois had a proposal based on their existing physicists at work. Michigan had some important people on the Appropriations Committee who may have taken certain [inaudible]. I don’t know. But in any event, what I’m saying is that under the circumstances, no matter what state you picked, you would have left the other states somewhat unhappy. Now normally that would not suffice to defeat the project, because most other states were kind of sensible enough to know they can’t win every competition. They may even have said that they benefited from the process by knowing how to prepare better proposals the next time. That [rejection?] coupled with the other impacts contributed. It diminished the level of enthusiasm and support.

Riordan:

I have another one of my real micro factors. The fall of [Texas Congressman] Jim Wright as Speaker of the House [ed., Wright resigned from Congress in 1989 amid an ethics investigation].

Brown:

Well, I wouldn’t belittle that. You know you not only lost Jim Wright, but you also lost Lloyd Bentsen, who was a Senator [ed., Bentsen stepped down in 1993 to become Treasury Secretary]. As the situation developed, those two losses may not have had an insignificant effect on [the ability to] keep the troops in line.

Riordan:

Meaning congressmen in the Democratic Party who would have had to cross Jim Wright on his top project if they wanted to have significant influence?

Brown:

Well, that was never mentioned in the debate. But it didn’t have to be. This is one of the underlying things that you wouldn’t expect to be mentioned as a matter of fact. With so and so from California or Illinois or Michigan voting typically in line with the Speaker. That would have an impact, but that would never be a matter of conversation unless you’re really trying to do a thorough historical analysis like you’re doing.

Riordan:

And if you think that it didn’t flatter [Senator Bentsen?] and Jim Wright as Speaker.

Brown:

Both of those guys are people with considerable principles. Undoubtedly it would have changed their posture if they…

Riordan:

What about the change of administrations? Certainly the Bush administration was very supportive of the SSC.

Brown:

Of course there was a confluence of the two parties in Texas, that was an asset. If you want to talk about the general importance of having a powerful state delegation, that would illustrate it. Because Texas all of a sudden went from having a powerful President, a powerful senator, and powerful Speaker of the House from different parties — so that they could cover both bases — to a situation substantially different. I don’t think that Clinton took an anti-SSC view, but he lacked the clout, and he lacked the sense of personal involvement, which is important for imposing discipline on the troops in Congress. So, that I would list that as a substantial micropolitical aspect. Even go beyond that: I’d consider Clinton a decidedly negative factor.

Riordan:

Finally, I’d like to ask you a series of a few “what if” questions. In other words, do you think the project would have survived if, for instance, the Japanese had contributed a billion dollars?

Brown:

I think it’s likely. That would have given us both the additional money, and the additional political value of an Asian partnership, which probably would have swung the support about.

Riordan:

What if the project had stuck to its original $6 billion price tag as authorized by Congress, say by downscoping it?

Brown:

You can’t try to downscope a project like that.

Riordan:

Well, if a choice was to go to 30 TeV machine instead of 40 TeV.

Brown:

How much would that have saved in dollars?

Riordan:

They could have kept it at the $6 billion level.

Brown:

Well, obviously keeping it at the level would have been a plus. I doubt if it would have been enough of a plus to save it under the circumstances, where the majority of the Congress was looking for some red meat. So, they were willing to cut the big projects to save big money. They couldn’t have used the argument that it was way over budget, but they could still have the argument that it was a misplaced priority and very expensive.

Riordan:

One of my questions was if Jim Wright had remained the Speaker. What if Bush had been reelected President in 1992?

Brown:

The chances of keeping it would have been much better. Much better. Because we would have continued to have Bush. Bentsen I think was reelected to his Senate seat at the same time that he lost the Vice Presidency [ed. Bentsen was the running mate of Michael Dukakis in the 1988 election].

Riordan:

When he lost the Vice Presidency, he was still reelected to the Senate. But he stepped down from the Senate.

Brown:

To take the job as Treasury Secretary.

Riordan:

To take the Treasury job. But he was senator at least for another two years.

Brown:

So, he might still have stepped down to take the Treasury and the Republicans… I don’t know. That obviously would have made a big difference to have a President who continued to support the SSC. Considering the fact that the Republicans took control of this Congress two years later, if Bush were President now, you would have had a President with a Republican Congress. It might have been in danger during a two-year period right after the previous election — actually, the Presidential election.

Riordan:

Because of?

Brown:

Obviously that’s a plus for keeping it alive, if Bush had been elected President.

Riordan:

Finally, if it had survived the 1993 budget battle, do you think it would be alive today? To answer that question… In other words, it would have had to face the 1994 test and it would have had to face the 1995 test. 1992 was really a watershed year [ed., When the House first voted to cease funding the SSC].

Brown:

I think it was. The politics took a hit that year and everything went downhill from there on. You can compare this to the space station, which was in danger then, too — both the support, and then it turned around on the vote last year, 1994.

Riordan:

Here’s my last question. You’re pretty much anticipating what I’ve got to ask here, which is to compare the two, the SSC and the space station.

Brown:

I’ve been comparing them all along. The lesson here is you can turn around a program that’s under pressure and going downhill in terms of support if you do the right things. It turned out that the space station did so out of pure luck more than anything else. After innumerable restructurings, it was finally able to make a fairly firm commitment to design and construction to guarantee the product to the cost and the schedule it had been committed to. It had the Russian angle to help guarantee it. The Russians in effect certified it, I think.

Riordan:

Good. I think you’ve answered my questions. We’ll probably come back to you once more with more detailed questions.

Brown:

That’s okay. Any time.

Riordan:

Thank you.